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Intervention in Vietnam and 
Central America: Parallels and 
Differences 
NOAM CHOMSKY 
The foil owing is Part I (Part II will 
run in the next issue) of an edited ver-
sion of a talk given at Harvard Univer-
sity on March 19, 1985, by Noam 
Chomsky, a member of the board of 
Resist. 
The speech was transcribed and pro-
duced by members and friends of the 
Harvard/ Radcliffe Committee on Cen-
tral America and the Central America 
Solidarity Association. Those in-
terested in obtaining the full text of the 
speech (18 pages single-spaced) can 
contact the Resist office. 
l the real world, U.S. global plan-
ning has always been sophisticated and 
careful, as you'd expect from a major 
superpower with a highly centralized 
and class conscious dominant social 
group. Their power, in turn is rooted in 
their own ownership and management 
of the society and economy, as is the 
norm in most societies. During World 
War II, American planners were very 
well aware that the United States was 
going to emerge as a world-dominant 
power in a position of hegemony that 
had few historical parallels and they 
organized and met in order to deal with 
this situation. 
From 1939 to 1945, extensive studies 
were conducted by the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the State 
Department. One group was called the 
War-Peace Studies Group, which met 
for six years and produced extensive 
geopolitical analyses and plans. The 
Council on Foreign Relations is essen-
tially the business input to foreign 
policy planning. These groups also in-
volved every top planner in the State 
Department with the exception of the 
Secretary of State. 
The conception that they developed 
is what they called "Grand Area" 
planning. The Grand Area was to be a 
region that was subordinated to the 
needs of the American economy. As 
one planner put it, it was to be the 
region that is ''strategically necessary 
for world control." The geopolitical 
analysis held that the Grand Area had 
to include at least the Western 
Hemisphere, the Far East and the 
former British Empire, which we were 
then in the process of dismantling and 
taking over ourselves. This is what is 
called "anti-imperialism" in American 
scholarship. The Area was also to in-
clude western and southern Europe 
and the oil-producing regions of the 
Middle East, and in fact, it was to in-
clude everything, if that were possible. 
Detailed plans were laid for particular 
regions of the Grand Area and also for 
international institutions that were to 
organize and police it, essentially in the 
interests of this subordination to 
American domestic needs. 
With respect to the Far East, the 
plans were roughly as follows: Japan, 
it was understood, would sooner or 
later be the industrial heartland of Asia 
once again. Since Japan is a resource-
poor area, it would need Southeast 
Asia and South Asia for resources and 
markets. All of this, of course, would 
be incorporated with the global system 
dominated by the United States. 
With regard to Latin America, the 
matter was put most plainly by 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson in 
May 1945 when he was explaining how 
we must eliminate and dismantle all 
regional systems dominated by any 
other power, particularly the British, 
while maintaining and extending our 
own system. He explained with regard 
to Latin America as follows: "I think 
that it's not asking too much to have 
our little region over here which never 
has bothered anybody." 
The basic thinking behind all this has 
been explained quite lucidly on a 
number of occasions. (This is a very 
open society and if one wants to learn 
what's going on, you can do it; it takes 
a little work, but the documents are 
Continued on page Two 
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there and the history is there also.) One 
of the clearest and most lucid accounts 
of the planning behind this was by 
George Kennan, who was one of the 
most thoughtful, humane, and liberal 
of the planners, and, in fact, was 
eliminated from the State Department 
largely for that reason. Kennan was the 
head of the State Department Policy 
Planning Staff in the late 1940's. In the 
following document, PPS23, February 
1948, he outlined the basic planning: 
"We have aboQt 50 percent of the 
world's wealth , but only 6.3 percent 
of its population. In this situation, 
we cannot fail to be the object of en-
vy and resentment. Our real test in 
the coming period is to devise a pat-
tern of relationships which will per-
mit us to maintain this position of 
disparity. We need not deceive 
ourselves that we can afford today 
the luxury of altruism and world-
benefaction .... We should cease to 
talk about vague and ... unreal ob-
jectives such as human rights, the 
raising of the living standards, and 
democratization. The day is not far 
off when we are going to have to deal 
in straight power concepts. The less 
we are hampered by idealistic 
slogans, the better." 
There are some questions that one 
can raise about Kennan's formulation, 
a number of them, but I'll keep to one. 
One is whether he is right in suggesting 
that "human rights, the raising of the 
living standards, and democratiza-
tion'' should be dismissed as irrelevant 
to American foreign policy. Actually, a 
review of the historical record suggests 
a different picture, namely that the 
United States often has opposed with 
tremendous ferocity, and violence, 
these elements -human rights, 
democratization, and the raising of liv-
ing standards. 
This is particularly the case in Latin 
America and there are very good 
reasons for it. The commitment of 
these doctrines is inconsistent with the 
use of harsh measures to maintain the 
disparity, to insure our control over 50 
percent of the resources, and our ex-
ploitation of the world. In short, what 
we might call ''the First Freedom'' 
(there were Four Freedoms, you 
remember, but there was one that was 
left out), the Freedom to Rob, and 
that's really the only one that counts; 
the others were mostly for show. And 
in order to maintain the freedom to rob 
and exploit, we do have to consistently 
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oppose democratization, the raising of 
living standards, and human rights. 
And we do consistently oppose them; 
that, of course is in the real world. 
This Top Secret document referred 
to the Far East, but Kennan applied the 
same ideas to Latin America in a brief-
ing for Latin American ambassadors in 
which he explained that: ''One of the 
main concerns of U.S. policy is the 
protection of our raw materials.'' Who 
must we protect our raw materials 
from? Well, primarily, the domestic 
populations, the indigenous popula-
tions, which may have ideas about rais-
ing living standards. And that's incon-
sistent with maintaining the disparity. 
How will we protect our raw materials 
from the indigenous population? Well, 
the answer is the following: 
"The final answer might be an 
unpleasant one, but . . . we should 
not hesitate before police repression 
by the local government. This is not 
shameful, since the Communists are 
essentially traitors .... It is better to 
have a strong regime in power than a 
liberal government if it is indulgent 
and relaxed and penetrated by Com-
munists."" 
Well, who are the Communists? 
''Communists'' is a term regularly 
used in American political theology to 
ref er to people who are committed to 
the belief that ''the government has 
direct responsibility for the welfare of 
the people." I'm quoting the words of 
a 1949 State Department intelligence 
report which warned about the spread 
of this grim and evil doctrine, which 
does, of course, threaten "our raw 
materials" if we can't abort it 
somehow. 
In the mid-1950's, these ideas were 
developed further. For example, one 
interesting case was an important study 
by a prestigious study group headed by 
William Yandell Eliot, who was the 
Williams Professor of Government at 
Harvard. They were also concerned 
with what Communism is and how it 
spreads. They concluded accurately 
that the primary threat of Communism 
is the economic transformation of the 
Communist powers "in ways which 
reduce their willingness and ability to 
complement the industrial economies 
of the West." That is essentially cor-
rect and is a good operational defini-
tion of "Communism" in American 
political discourse. Our government is 
committed to that view. 
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If a government is so evil or other-
wise as to undertake a course of action 
of this sort, it immediately becomes an 
enemy. It becomes a part of the 
''monolithic and ruthless conspiracy'' 
to take over the world, as John F. Ken-
nedy put it. It is postulated that they 
have been taken over by the Russians if 
that's the policy that they appear to be 
committed to. 
On these grounds, American policy 
towards Nicaragua after the 1979 
revolution could have been predicted 
by simply observing that the health and 
education budget of Nicaragua rose 
rapidly, that an effective land reform 
program was instituted, and that the 
infant mortality rate dropped very 
dramatically, to the point where 
Nicaragua won an award from the 
World Health Organization for health 
achievements (all of this despite horri-
fying conditions left by the Somoza 
dictatorship which we had installed 
and supported, and continued to sup-
port to the very end, despite a lot of 
nonsense to the contrary that one 
hears.) If a country is devoted to 
policies like I've just described it is ob-
viously the enemy. It is part of "the 
monolithic and ruthless conspiracy'' -
the Russians are taking it over. And, in 
fact, it is part of a conspiracy. It is part 
of a conspiracy to take from us what is 
Continued on page Seven 
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Reform, Resistance and Reaction in 
South Africa 
DAVID L. GOODMAN 
There is a t ndency by many peo-
ple to view the unrest taking place right 
now in South Africa as part of a 
monolithic pattern of continued 
violence in that country. But this is not 
the case in 1985. There has been a ma-
jor escalation of grassroots protest in 
South Africa since September 1984, 
and this has been to a large extent the 
result of an increasingly politicized 
population. 
Two major incidents that have taken 
place this year, namely the massacre on 
the anniversary of the Sharpeville kill-
ings and the riots that took place in the 
Crossroads squatter camps in Febru-
ary, dramatize this new politicization. 
In February, police armored person-
nel carriers moved in on the sprawling 
Crossroads squatter camp near Cape 
Town. Crossroads is home to over 
100,000 people, the majority of whom 
live there illegally as a result of ''influx 
control" laws which prohibit blacks 
from living in or near the all white 
preserves of Cape Town. Police were 
coming to Crossroads to begin one of 
Pretoria's most ambitious-and 
vicious-forced removal programs to 
date. White authorities are preparing 
to force a quarter of a million black 
South Africans to a new city that has 
recently been completed on a sand 
wasteland 16 miles from Cape Town, 
called Kayalitscha. But the squatter 
camp residents began preparing back 
in the early fall for these removals. The 
Crossroads executive committee was 
meeting regularly to map strategy to 
mobilize people against the removals. 
The KTC squatter camp was holding 
regular Sunday meetings in prepara-
tion for when the state escalated its 
campaign. 
And in February, the battles began. 
Rumor had spread in the squatter 
camps that police were about to move 
in to begin the removals. The squatters 
mobilized quickly. Pre-arranged choke 
points inside Crossroads were closed, 
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and piles of trash were placed 
strategically to prevent police vehicles 
from passing. The South African 
Police (SAP) responded in the way 
people have become accustomed to, by 
opening fire on the defiant squatters. 
The confrontation left 18 dead and 
hundreds wounded. It also forced the 
South African Minister of Cooperation 
and Development, Gerrit Viljoen, to 
declare a temporary truce and suspend 
the removals. 
What followed in March was a sur-
prise even to seasoned opponents of 
the apartheid regime. Winnie Mandela, 
appearing on ABC's Night line show, 
predicted that the state would not be so 
stupid as to provoke -an incident on the 
anniversary of the Sharpeville 
massacre. But on March 21, 25 years to 
the day after 69 unarmed people pro-
testing the same pass law system were 
gunned down by the SAP, another 21 
people (an official figure which 
residents say represents less than half 
the real figure) were murdered by 
police near the major industrial center 
of Port Elizabeth. 
The massacre in March was preceded 
by the second major general strike to 
hit South Africa in five months. On 
November 5 and 6, the Transvaal 
region of South Africa, which includes 
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the industrial centers of Johannesburg 
and Pretoria, was paralyzed by a 
general strike called to protest the 
detentions of black political leaders 
and the repression in the townships. In 
March, the Port Elizabeth factories, 
including those of Ford and General 
Motors, ground to a halt when black 
workers went on strike. Authorities 
tried to force people back to work, but 
to no avail. The strike was at a peak 
when the SAP opened fire on a funeral 
procession on March 21. The response 
of the police must be seen partly as a 
panicked response by the state, an act 
of desperation when the most effective 
weapon in the hands of South African 
blacks, their labor, was being used with 
considerable success. 
The wave of protests going on in 
South Africa now began in earnest in 
September 1984. There were a number 
of events that occurred in South Africa 
to spark those protests, the largest and 
most widespread since the Soweto 
uprising of 1976. But as the Rev. Frank 
Chikane, a member of the UDF's 
(United Democratic Front) national ex-
ecutive who will soon go on trial for 
high treason, was quick to point out, 
"The present situation is different. 
Protest can't be mopped up like in 
1976. You are dealing with people with 
a political consciousness now.'' 
The major causes of urban unrest 
that began eight months ago have been 
the opposition in the townships to two 
new disguises of apartheid policy that 
came into being in the past year: black 
local government and the new constitu-
tion. 
The Black Local Authorities (BLA) 
Act of 1982 directed that the residents 
of an urban black township could vote 
for members of a local town or city 
council. This council is charged with 
providing and maintaining basic ser-
vices such as water and electricity, road 
building and trash removal. They have 
also been given control of the police 
force and responsibility for enforcing 
pass laws. 
Continued on page Four 
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But the councils have not been given 
any money with which to operate, so 
they must function solely on income 
received from sales of alcohol, fines, 
property levies and utility service 
charges. House rents are paid to a dif-
ferent government agency. 
In practice, 70 percent of the income 
of the administration boards (the 
forerunner of the town councils) was 
derived from the sales of alcohol in 
1980-81. The town councils are further 
starved for money as a result of a law 
passed in the early '70's that declared a 
township such as Soweto, lying outside 
of Johannesburg, was thereafter "au-
tonomous." This was a euphemism for 
saying that it was financially cut off 
from a wealthy urban center and would 
receive none of the taxes paid by the 
large corporations and wealthy 
residents of the cities. 
The new black town councils are 
politically impotent, ultimately being 
under the control of the Minister of 
Cooperation and Development (for-
merly the Minister of Bantu Affairs). 
This branch of government administers 
most of the apartheid laws that affect 
black people, from bantu education to 
forced removals. The government 
claimed, however, that the act would 
provide Africans with a bigger say in 
the running of their townships. But the 
government's real intention was cap-
tured in a newspaper editorial that 
stated: "the rule is simple: Africans 
must pay for their own houses and ser-
vices. If they can't afford it, they must 
go and live in the homelands." 
Elections for the new town councils 
were held in November and December 
1982. Community leaders, led by the 
UDF, called for a boycott of the elec-
tions. They claimed that the new coun-
cilors would be government puppets. 
The election results surprised even 
supporters of the plan in Pretoria. 
Black turnout for the BLA elections 
was less than 21 percent nationwide. 
The UDF charged that the numbers 
were inflated and that actual turnout 
was less than 10 percent. One example 
of black sentiment toward the election 
was demonstrated in the township of 
Evaton. Of the 33,000 adults living 
there, only 535 people voted in the 
council elections. Black township 
residents let it be known that they 
would not be duped so easily by the 
facade of reform. 
As always, the promise of big 
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paychecks, houses and political power 
provided the policy's architects with 
the black councilors they needed to do 
Pretoria's work (and the Minister of 
Cooperation and Development was 
authorized to appoint councilors in 
case none were elected.) 
The social and economic position of 
the new councils fits in with President 
Botha's plan to develop a pool of 
black, middle-class bureaucrats who 
can both represent Pretoria's interests 
and stand as a buff er between the 
government and . the masses of poor, 
discontented blacks. But more impor-
tant, it is these black puppet leaders, 
such as the heads of the bantustans, 
whom Pretoria points to as the ''true 
leaders" of the black people. It is with 
these leaders that Pretoria will 
negotiate the future of South Africa's 
23 million blacks. 
As Minister of Constitutional Devel-
opment and Planning Chris Heuin put 
it, "By leaders, I don't imply that we 
have only to consult with the leaders of 
the national independent states, but 
also with identified urban leaders, 
especially those who seek solutions on 
a constitutional and peaceful basis .... 
We will not talk to people that opt for 
revolutionary or forcible changes in 
this country.'' Both Pretoria and 
Washington can point to "negotia-
tions'' and ''open discussions'' that are 
taking place with South Africa's black 
"leaders," thus preserving the facade 
of progress while further entrenching 
the reality of apartheid. 
In the past 10 months, township 
residents have been proven correct in 
their predictions about the new coun-
cils. The new councillors have quickly 
set about raising property rents and 
levying surcharges in a desperate attempt 
to keep themselves and their townships 
solvent. 
In the Transvaal township of Davey-
town, rents were raised by 200 
percent. The Soweto City Council in-
creased water tariffs by $2.15, and 
levied an electricity surcharge of $12 
per household - even for households 
that had no electricity. 
Then in October of this year, the 
Soweto city council voted to provide a 
plot of land for Soweto "mayor" 
Ephraim Tshabalala that would ac-
commodate his plans for a two-story 
house, tennis courts, meeting rooms 
and swimming pool. Despite the fact 
that the wait for housing in the over-
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crowded township is often longer than 
five years, the Council approved a 
residential plot that is big enough to 
hold 50 houses. 
The people have responded angrily 
to this new form of government con-
trol. On September 3rd residents of the 
townships of the so-called Vaal 
Triangle, an area about 30 miles south 
of Johannesburg, stayed away from 
work to protest increased rents. 
Throughout the day shops were looted, 
and the homes of the new town coun-
cillors were petro-bombed. It marked 
the beginning of the protests which still 
continue. 
At one point, people marching 
peacefully by one of the town coun-
cillor's houses were greeted by gun-
shots, as the councillor began firing at 
them. Riots broke out, and after two 
days 70 people lay dead, including four 
town councillors. Several other coun-
cillors heeded residents demands and 
resigned their positions. In Soweto two 
weeks later, five people were killed by 
police in a similar "stay-away." And 
in two seperate incidents that occured 
on October 28th, the mayors of two 
different black townships in the 
Easters Transvaal had their houses at-
tacked and burned down by angry 
mobs of residents. Since late October 
numerous town councils have resigned 
en masse. Alister Sparks of the Rand 
Daily Mail estimates that since the 
stay-away of November 5th and 6th, 
township unrest "has virtually wiped 
out the system of black local 
authorities,'' with only four of the 22 
councils in the Transvaal province still 
functioning. 
The South African government is 
reluctant to admit that the violence in 
the townships has a decidely political 
overtone, pref erring to blame it on 
"outside agitators." Much of the 
violence is directed specifically at the 
institutional symbols of apartheid -
namely the government-backed ''pup-
pet" leaders, their businesses, and 
government buildings. In a recent inci-
dent the government administration 
buildings in the large black township of 
Queenstown were burned down by pro-
testers in late April. 
Even the Financial Mail, an in-
fluential South Africa business 
magazine, has written, ''Black councils 
established under the BLA Act seem 
doomed. Members are quitting their 
posts in response to calls by activist 
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groups." 
As an alternative to the town coun-
cils, the major townships have elected 
their own civic associations, which have 
actively organized residents to fight the 
rent increases and the policies of the 
town councils. This struggle for demo-
cratic control of the communities has 
been a major cause of urban unrest. 
The new constitution represents a 
different kind of assault on the black 
majority. The constitution went hand 
in hand with the propaganda stunt in-
tended by the BLA act. In a pamphlet 
entitled "Guidelines for a New Dispen-
sation," the government's Department 
of Constitutional Planning and 
Development posed the question, 
''Why are blacks not included in the 
new dispensation?" The answer given 
was: "Blacks already have their own 
governments and administration as for 
example, in KwaZulu (where Zulu 
ministers tend to their own affairs), or 
in Soweto, where new councils with ex-
tended powers are to be established.'' 
The new constitution provides for a 
tricameral parliament with representa-
tion for colored and Indian people. 
The parliament now consists of a white 
House of Assembly (178 members), a 
colored House of Representatives (85 
members) and an Indian House of 
Delegates (45 members). 
Blacks had already been given a taste 
of the kind of reform promised by the 
new constitution. "The Black Local 
Authorities, Indian and Colored 
parliaments are doomed to failure," 
predicted a member of the popularly-
based Soweto Civic Association. 
''They are unacceptable and don't 
have the support of the people. I am 
convinced that our experience with the 
new councils is the indicator of things 
to come under the new parliament. The 
same lies, the same promises, and even-
tually worse hardships for us." A 
multi-racial coalition led by the UDF 
organized a nationwide boycott of 
what they called the "sham elections." 
The elections, held in August, were 
boycotted by over 80 percent of the 
eligible Indian and colored voters. 
The timing of the new parliamentary 
elections in late August and the beginn-
ings of the major riots in the black 
townships in early September is no co-
incidence. It represents both a 
coalescence of opposition and an 
agonizing climax of black frustration 
and anger. 
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Both the black, local authorities and 
the new constitution must be under-
stood in the context of the larger apar-
theid strategy. The BLAs evolved as 
part of Botha's dream of a social, 
economic and political ''constellation 
of South Africa States.'' Within this 
scheme, rural blacks would be left to 
manage their own affairs in the form 
of independent homelands. Urban 
blacks would be represented by a na-
tional body based on the town coun-
cils. The bulk of South Africa would 
be preserved for the whites. 
Together with the new constitution, 
the new reforms represent a refinement 
of South Africa's overarching divide-
and-rule strategy. It is a strategy of 
wholesale cultural, social and 
economic destruction. Not only are In-
dians and coloreds set against the 
blacks in the new constitutional dispen-
sation, but non-whites have delivered a 
resounding blow to this plan. They 
have resisted imposed divisions and left 
Pretoria haphazard and defensive in its 
attempts to maintain the advantage. 
The price for the struggle in the 
townships has been high. Over 300 
people have been killed since 
September, all but one of them black, 
and the vast majority the victims of 
police bullets. And the death toll con-
tinues to climb. 
State repression is also reflected in 
the fact that over 1000 people had been 
detained without trial by the end of 
1984. And a new feature of state reac-
tion has been the use of conscripted 
troops of the South African Defense 
Force (SADF) to quell urban unrest. 
Beginning with the development of 
7000 troops in black townships in late 
October, the SADF had for the first 
time in South African history been 
brought in numerous times in past 
months to back-up the beleagured and 
overwhelmed SAP. The · use of the 
SADF represent a major escalation of 
the urban conflict and is also an indica-
tion of how threatened Pretoria feels 
by the continuing level of protest. 
An editorial appearing in the Cape 
Times in late October argued, 
"Pretoria can theoretically ring 
EVERY urban township with steel, but 
the basic causes of bitterness among 
blacks, if not addressed will grow. 
While Mr. Heunis, Dr. Viljoen and 
their cabinet colleqgues [Ministers of 
Constitutional Planning and Develop-
ment, and of Cooperation and 
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Development respectively] fiddle 
around on the periphery of the prob-
lem, producing the odd bit of relief 
here and there, the basic causes of 
black unrest are left untouched. They 
include influx control, inferior educa-
tion and services and, most important, 
a new constitution which leaves blacks 
in limbo. . . Some black leaders have 
already branded [this] civil war." 
The resistance by blacks and the 
state response make a mockery of the 
notion that reform is taking place in 
South Africa. What Pretoria has con-
firmed by its actions in the townships is 
the total failure of its ''new deal'' 
policies to appease the majority blacks' 
struggle for a democratic, non-racial 
society. The regime's heavy handed 
reaction also legitimates the power of 
its new opposition, which has put the 
Botha government and its proxies on 
the defensive. And this opposition, by 
nearly all accounts, is only in the for-
mative stage. 
David L. Goodman is a free-lance 
journalist based in Boston. He recently 
returned from southern Africa, where 
he was writing for In These Times and 
The Nation. 
The Resist Pledge System 
The most important source of Resist's 
income is monthly pledges. Pledges 
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us 
a minimum monthly income. In turn, 
pledges receive a monthly reminder let-
ter (in addition to the newsletter) which 
contains news of recent grants and 
other Resist activities. So take the 
plunge and become a Resist pledge! 
Yes, I would like to pledge S 
monthly to the work of Resist. 
Name ___________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
City ___ State __ Zip ___ _ 
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COMMIITEE 
~ As people are beginning to remember the tenth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, they are 
forgetting one of its victims, Vietnamese political activist David Truong. David, who was convicted of 
espionage in 1978, has been imprisoned in Federal institutions since January 1982. The Nation (March 2, 
1985) stated that "Truong's real crime was working for reconciliation between the United States and 
Vietnam." 
~ While the government has expended over $1,000,000 prosecuting David Truong and another 
$150,000 imprisoning him for what several of his former prosecutors now admit was insignificant, that 
same government is preparing to deport him after he is paroled in August 1986. In a letter to the Appeals 
Board of the Federal Parole Commission in 1983 requested immediate parole and voluntary departation 
to France. [ So far, the Justice Department has declined to even discuss this option.] 
~ To fight these injustices and to support David's ongoing work and study, 
THE VIETNAM TRIAL SUPPORT COMMITIEE APPEALS TO 
YOU TO SUPPORT DAVID TRUONG'S CASE. 
~ David, who is incarcerated at the Federal Institution at Petersburg, Virginia earns S.11 per hour, or S15 per 
month, at his 35-hour a week clerical job. Just to stay in touch with the real world outside, David needs postage for 
leners to his friends and colleagues, and money for books and about two dozen newspaper and magazine 
subscriptions-his most essential necessity. $15 a month will buy no more than a few pieces of fruit, coffee, toilet 
articles and everyday items at highly-inflated prison commissary prices. 
THE VIETNAM TRIAL SUPPORT COMMITIEE 
MUST RAISE $10,000 
_, $50 per month, or $600 per year, for David's personal expenses 
~ $100 per month, or $1,200 per year, for David's postage costs 
~ $150 per month, or $1,800 per year, for David's newspapers, magazines, and books 
~ $7,000 for legal and other anticipated expenses for David's deportation case. 
Please fill out the coupon below and make a generous contribution to the Vietnam '!rial Support 
Committee. For those making a contribution of $50 or more you may make your check payable to the 
Asia Resource Center to make the contribution tax-deductible. 
The Vietnam Trial Support Committee • P.O. Box 53393 • Washington, D.C. 20009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D Yes, I would like to contribute to the VNTSC to continue its support of David 1ruong. I would like to 
contribute: 
• $500 • $100 
• $50 • $25 Name __________________________ _ 
D Other______ Address 
• Please place me on the --------------------------
VNTSC mailing list for City ___________________________ _ 
updates on David's case. State _______________ Zip __________ _ 
Mail to: Vietnam 1rial Support Committee-P.O. Box 53393, Washington, D.C. 20009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
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ours, namely "our raw materials," and 
a conspiracy to prevent us from 
"maintaining the disparity," which of 
course, must be the fundamental ele-
ment of our foreign policy. 
Well, it is obvious that a country of 
this sort is an enemy-that is, part of 
"the monolithic and ruthless con-
spiracy" -and that we have to take 
drastic measures to ensure that ''the 
rot does not spread,'' which is the ter-
minology constantly used by the plan-
ners. In fact, when one reads reports of 
this kind or looks at the health and 
education statistics-the nutritional 
level, land reform, and so on-one can 
understand very well why American 
hostility to Nicaragua has reached such 
fanatic, and almost hysterical levels. It 
follows from the geopolitical concep-
tion previously outlined. 
The people who are committed to 
these dangerous heresies such as using 
their resources for their own purposes 
or believing that the government is 
committed to the welfare of its own 
people and so on, may not be Soviet 
clients to begin with and, in fact, quite 
regularly they're not. In Latin 
America, they are often members, to 
begin with, of Bible study groups that 
become self-help groups, church 
organizations, peasant organizations, 
and so on and so forth. But by the time 
we get through with them, they will be 
Soviet clients. The reason they will be 
Soviet clients by the time we get 
through with them is that they will 
have nowhere else to turn for any 
minimal form of protection against the 
terror and violence that we regularly 
unleash against them if they undertake 
programs of the kind described. 
And this is a net gain for American 
policy. One thing you'll notice, if you 
look over the years, is that the United 
States quite consistently tries to create 
enemies if a country does escape from 
the American grip. What we want to 
do is drive the country into being a 
base for the Russians because that 
justifies us in carrying out the violent 
attacks which we must carry out, given 
the geopolitical conception under 
which we organize and control much of 
the world. So that's what we do, and 
then we "defend" ourselves. We 
engage in self-defense against the Great 
Satan or the Evil Empire or the 
''monolithic and ruthless conspiracy.'' 
More generally, the Soviet Union 
plays the same kind of game within its 
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narrower domains, and that explains a 
good bit of the structure of the Cold 
War, in fact. 
Well, what has all of this meant for 
Indochina and Central America? Let's 
begin with Indochina. 
Now remember I'm talking about 
the real world, not the one in the PBS 
television series and so on. In the real 
world what happened was that, by 
1948, the American State Department 
recognized, explicitly, that Ho Chi 
Minh was the sole significant leader of 
Vietnamese nationalism, but that if 
Vietnamese nationalism was suc-
cessful, it could be a threat to the 
Grand Area, and therefore something 
had to be done about it. The threat was 
not so much in Vietnam itself, which is 
not terribly important for American 
purposes (the freedom to rob in Viet-
nam is not all that significant); the fear 
was that ''the rot would spread,'' 
namely the rot of successful social and 
economic development. In a very poor 
country which had suffered enormous-
ly under European colonialism, suc-
cessful social and economic develop-
ment could have a demonstration ef-
fect. Such development could be a 
model for people elsewhere and could 
lead them to try to duplicate it and 
gradually the Grand Area would 
unravel. 
So, for example, when the Bishop 
regime in Grenada began to take any 
constructive moves, it was immediately 
the target of enormous American 
hostility, not because the little speck in 
the Caribbean is any potential military 
threat or any of that sort of business. It 
is a threat in some other respects; if a 
tiny, nothing-country with no natural 
resources like this can begin to ex-
tricate itself from the system of misery 
and oppression that we've helped to 
impose, then others who have even 
more resources might be tempted to do 
likewise. 
Well, we recognized that we had to 
prevent the rot from spreading so we 
had to support France in its effort to 
reconquer its former colony, and we 
did so. By the time the French had 
given up, we were providing about 80 
percent of the costs of the war and in 
fact we came close to using nuclear 
weapons towards the end, by 1954, in 
Indochina. 
There was a political settlement, the 
Geneva Accords, in 1954, which the 
United States bitterly opposed. We im-
Continued on page Eight 
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mediately proceeded to undermine 
them, installing in South Vietnam a 
violent, terrorist regime, which, of 
course, rejected (with our support) the 
elections which were projected. Then, 
the regime turned to a terrorist attack 
against the population, particularly 
against the anti-French Resistance, 
which we called the Viet Cong, in 
South Vietnam. The regime had killed 
about 80,000 people (that means we 
had killed, through our plans and 
mercenaries) by the time John F. Ken-
nedy took over in 1961. This assault 
against the population, after several 
years, did arouse resistance-such acts 
have a way of doing that-and by 
1959, the anti-French Resistance 
received authorization from the Com-
munist leadership, after several years 
and after tens of thousands of people 
were murdered, to use violence in self-
defense. Then, the government, which 
we had established, immediately began 
to collapse because it had no popular 
support, as the United States conced-
ed. 
By 1959, the Resistance began to 
receive some support from the nor-
thern half of the country in retaliation 
against the violence unleashed by the 
American-organized attack from 
against the population of the southern 
part of Vietnam. The government we 
had installed to carry out this attack 
and to block the political agreements 
quickly began to collapse as soon as 
resistance began. Then Kennedy had a 
problem. It's important to realize how 
he handled this. This is one of the dis-
similarities between Vietnam and Cen-
tral America to which I will return. In 
1961 and 1962 Kennedy simply launch-
ed a war against South Vietnam. That 
is, in 1961 and 1962, the American Air 
Force began extensive bombing and 
defoliation in South Vie.tnam, aimed 
primarily against the rural areas where 
85 percent of the population lived. This 
was part of a program designed to 
drive several million people to concen-
tration camps, which we called "stra-
tegic hamlets,'' where they would be 
surrounded by armed guards and barb-
ed wire, "protected," as we put it, 
from the guerrillas who, we conceded, 
they were willingly supporting. That's 
what we call "aggression" or "armed 
attack" when some other country does 
it. We call it "defense" when we do it. 
This was when the "defense" of 
South Vietnam escalated, with this at-
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tack in 1961 and 1962. But that again 
failed. The resistance increased, and by 
1965, the United States was compelled 
to move to an outright land invasion of 
South Vietnam, escalating that attack 
again. We also at that time initiated the 
bombing of North Vietnam, which, as 
anticipated, brought North Vietnamese 
troops to the South several months 
later. 
Throughout, however, the major 
American attack was against South 
Vietnam. When we began bombing 
North Vietnam in February 1965, we 
extended the bombing of South Viet-
nam which had already been going on 
for several years. We extended the 
bombing of South Vietnam to triple 
the scale of the bombing of North Viet-
nam, and throughout, it was South 
Vietnam that bore the main brunt of 
the American war in Indochina. We 
later extended the war to Cambodia 
and Laos. 
As far as the major aims were con-
cerned, the American war was a 
smashing success. For one thing, there 
was a huge massacre. The first phase of 
the war, the French war, probably left 
about half a million dead. From 1954 
to 1965 we succeeded in killing maybe 
another 160,000 to 170,000 South Viet-
namese, mostly peasants. The war, 
from 1965 to 1975, left a death toll of 
maybe in the neighborhood of 3 
million people. There were also 
perhaps a million dead in Cambodia 
and Laos. So all together about 5 
million people were killed, which is a 
respectable achievement when you 're 
trying to prevent any successful social 
and economic development. Further-
more, there were millions and millions 
of refugees created by the American 
bombardment, which was quite ex-
traordinarily savage, not to mention 
the murderous ground operations. 
The land was devastated. People 
can't farm because of the destruction 
and unexploded ordance. And this is 
all a success. Vietnam is not going to be 
a model of social and economic 
development for anyone else. In fact, it 
will be lucky to survive. The rot will 
not spread. We also made sure of that 
by our actions in the surrounding 
areas, where we buttressed the 
American positions. 
The post-war American policy has 
been designed to insure that it stays 
that way. We follow a policy of what 
some conservative business circles out 
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of the United States call "bleeding 
Vietnam.'' That is, a policy of impos-
ing maximum suffering and harshness 
in Vietnam in the hope of perpetuating 
the suffering and insuring that only the 
most harsh and brutal elements will 
survive. Then you can use their brutali-
ty as a justification for having carried 
out the initial attack. This is done con-
stantly and quite magnificently in our 
ideological system. We are now sup-
porting Pol Pot forces; we concede this 
incidentally. The State Department has 
stated that our reason for supporting 
the Democratic Kampuchea Coalition, 
which is largely based on Khmer Rouge 
forces, is because of its ''continuity'' 
with the Pol Pot regime, therefore we 
support it indirectly through China or 
through other means. This is part of 
the "bleeding Vietnam." Also, of 
course, we offer no aid, no repara-
tions, though we certainly owe them. 
We block aid from international in-
stitutions and we've succeeded in 
blocking aid from other countries. 
India tried to send, in 1977, 100 buf-
falo, a very small amount, to Vietnam 
to try to replenish the buffalo herd that 
was destroyed in the war. We tried to 
block it by threatening to cancel Food 
for Peace aid to India if they sent the 
100 buffalo. Mennonites in the U.S. 
tried to send pencils to Cambodia; 
again the State Department tried to 
block it. They also tried to send shovels 
to Laos to dig up the unexploded or-
dance. Of course, we could do it easily 
with heavy equipment, but that we are 
plainly not going to do. 0 
Recent Resist Grants 
Committee in Solidarity with the Peo-
ple of El Salvador, Midwest Region 
(Chicago, IL) $600 
Central American Refugee Defense 
Fund (Boston, MA) $300 
NY Women Against Rape (NY,NY) 
$600 
American Indian Environmental 
Council (Albuquerque, NM) $600 
Clergy and Laity Concerned (Eugene, 
OR) $600 
NH Women's Peace Center (Con-
cord, NH) $250 
Middle East Research Information 
Project (MERIP) (NY, NY) $500 
Black and Proud Elementary School 
(Jackson, MS) $250 
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